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U.S. and Britain again target Afghan poppies
Officials hope to provide alternatives before planting season begins in Oct.

(WP) The U.S. and British governments plan to spend millions of dollars over the next two months to try to persuade Afghan farmers not to plant opium poppy, by far the country's most profitable cash crop and a major source of Taliban funding and official corruption.

By selling wheat seeds and fruit saplings to farmers at token prices, offering cheap credit, and paying poppy-farm laborers to work on roads and irrigation ditches, U.S. and British officials hope to provide alternatives before the planting season begins in early October. Many poppy farmers survive Afghanistan's harsh winters on loans advanced by drug traffickers and their associates, repaid with the spring harvest.

"We need a way to get money in [farmers'] hands right away," said a senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan.

The program replaces the Bush administration's focus on crop eradication, which "wasted hundreds of millions of dollars," according to Richard C. Holbrooke, the Obama administration's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Destroying the crops succeeded only in "alienat[ing] poor farmers" and "driving people into the hands of the Taliban," he told reporters last week.

Poor track record
But many previous U.S.-funded crop-substitution programs have failed as well, from Asia to Latin America. A similar plan in Colombia, begun in the late 1990s, has barely made a dent in the level of cocaine production, although the country began to stabilize in recent years as its U.S.-trained military adopted new strategies against armed insurgents and civil institutions were strengthened.

Officials maintain that the new Afghan plan differs from unsuccessful "alternative" plans because it is an integral part of a military-development strategy that includes tens of thousands of U.S. troops to keep the Taliban and traffickers at bay while Afghan security forces are being trained. Plans call for hundreds of U.S. and international aid experts to work directly with farmers and local officials until the Afghan government has matured.

"The way [the assistance] is offered is important," said the senior U.S. military official, one of [..]
..

The epicenter of the overlapping wars against opium production and the Taliban is southern Afghanistan's Helmand province, where more than two-thirds of the country's poppy is grown. Thousands of Marines and British troops are in the midst of a major offensive there against entrenched insurgent forces and are providing security in villages as they are cleared.

Wheat seeds and fruit saplings. What happened to Steyr's alternative crop?

Seeing the lesser of two evils win probably shouldn't bring unalloyed joy, but I don't want the Taliban in either.

Their recent 'drafting' of local youth to be (unwilling) suicide bombers hasn't exactly been winning them popularity contests itself.

I'm waiting for the golden thoughts of our resident strategic and tactical thinker.

I"m still waiting to find out which class of CGSC he'll be attending.

Steyr AUG wrote:

Bat wrote:

Wheat seeds and fruit saplings. What happened to Steyr's alternative crop?

Missed in Karen's rush to produce a story without doing basic research on the problem.

Seemed thorough enough to me. Interviews with officers making no mention of it either... and if it's not timely it's not news. This wasn't a postwar analysis.

So you'll be keeping us up on this? I note you offer no info, either. We'll be wanting all the info in the public domain, and sturner's waiting on golden thoughts too.

Steyr AUG wrote:

Bat wrote:

Seemed thorough enough to me. Interviews with officers making no mention of it either...

Ah yes, the unnamed "senior military official" Always a classic.

The other 'great game' must continue; we mustn't repeat 'Nam, no? 41 said we'd put that behind us... at least since GW1 you restrict [sorry- 'embed'] journalists "for their own safety" so they can't see what you don't want them to, they try and ferret out what they can aside from the official PRs. Wouldn't want some officer cashiered for going off the reservation; just as tricky knowing when you're being spun under guise of confidence. Credible contacts and experience are good, and not all knowledge is in the OCS curricula or the Point.

Good thing there's still some institutional memory left around.

But, this comment wasn’t something I pulled out of my reporter's notebook from my recent trip to Afghanistan – although it could be. It's actually a quote from then-Col. John 'Mick' Nicholson, commander of Task Force Spartan, in Eastern Afghanistan, back in April of 2006.

Interestingly, Nicholson's boss at the time was Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the then-commander of U.S. and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Now fast-forward more than three years. I am back in Kabul, but I kept flashing back to that earlier conversation as I listened to Eikenberry, now the new U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, define for me what he called "the conditions for success" here.

"First you must secure the area and separate the people from the enemy, Jim. But right behind that, steps have to be taken to help the government of Afghanistan..." My thoughts drifted as Eikenberry went on to describe the need for "good governance" and a "sense of justice." I was thinking instead about how I'd heard this "new doctrine" before, almost word for word.
..

What is new – and a potential breakthrough – is the commitment that the U.S. government appears to have made to the strategy in Afghanistan.

Congress has allocated tens of billions of new dollars, not just to the fight, but, for instance, to turning Afghanistan back into the agricultural powerhouse it was before 30 years of war destroyed it.

The mission matching the means
When Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke recently paid a visit to staffers in Kabul at what he called "the most important embassy in the world," he made this "new commitment" his first talking point.

"I can assure you that President Obama is personally committed to this mission, and that the resources you've required for so many years are now being made available to you,'' Holbrooke promised. During his remarks, I caught a glimpse of now-Gen. 'Mick' Nicholson, standing among the crowd, and beaming with approval.

This was payback, I thought, for those years when the boots and weapons and intelligence assets flowed mostly out of Afghanistan and into Iraq.

Over the years covering the U.S. war in Afghanistan, I've often been struck by the disconnect between U.S. commanders on the ground and the politicians back home. It felt like a constant tug of war between the mission and the means.

In 2006, Nicholson, and a few others, spoke eloquently of the ways to win "trust and confidence" in Kunar or Nuristan, and other Taliban strongholds, but their hands often seemed tied by other priorities, usually in Iraq.

The unspoken truth back then was that, despite gains made in several successful battles, there were never enough U.S. troops, or Afghan forces, to hold those gains, or build the Afghan infrastructure. Clear-hold-build was still-born.

So you'll be keeping us up on this?

Its easily enough to find for those who are really interested, those who arent will continue to ignore per usual.

But Steyr, we consider you our own personal Disinformation Officer. Think of the career possibilities, this on your resume and all...

It's your job to call our attention to these things.


ed- my color

Last edited by Bat (2009-08-10 4:14 pm)

Bat wrote:

Going into the southern Afghan poppy fields to take & hold with the increase in troop strength. They've been in the region and training the last month. Orders are to surround and wait out resistance rather than call in air strikes, minimize civilian casualties

Hmm, so, given poppies are to Afghanistan as oil is to Iraq. . .

:: looks for a vein ::

sturner wrote:

The principles of combatting a guerrilla war (otherwise known as an insurrgency) hasn't changed. It was the same during the Napoleonic incursion into Spain as it was during the Japanese occupation of Indo-China, as it was during the myrid wars of liberation since then.

For academics sitting in their easy chairs the principles might not have changed, but they dont have a stake in translating those principles into a winning strategy. The .mil of today is completely different than any military in history, and the actual struggle is different as well. Its a basic premise of COIN that you cant directly transfer tactics from one COIN to another, you have to adapt it to the local situation. Two situations which are nothing like Vietnam.

While this may be hard to grasp because you are on the outside looking in, this is how it is on the ground.

KHannon wrote:

Steyr AUG wrote:

The restrictions are primarily to keep them from Geraldoing the unit they are with and getting people killed.

Honest Q: I don't get this reference.  Did Geraldo royally smurf something up while embedded with a unit?

He showed the area a unit was in Iraq and where it was going next.

Bat wrote:

Of course, I reffed actual journalists. It's been over 20 years since Geraldo's much-hyped (early days of Fox, IIRC- coinicidence?) debacle with the opening of Al Capone's vault.

What *are* you talking about? Geraldo let sensitive information out in a live broadcast in 2003

I rarely 'eat up' anything but food. I didn't take your spin at face value either, and would note that it did not come up even when referencing such subjects, by men better placed to be up on it than even yourself- Nicholson, Eikenberry, Holbrooke, to name a few. If your program was as near-magical as you've implied, you'd think they might at least have mentioned it en passant. It's not exactly secret.

Name drop all you want, but your imperceptive analysis of the situation makes it hard to believe you have even performed the most basic of cursory reading on the subject.

It's a good adage and has stood the test of time,

In its current usage, its a vast oversimplification of a complex subject pontificated by individuals who lack insight into the situation they are commenting on.

Bat wrote:

I was referring to one of the earlier incidents in the course of the self-destruction of his creds as a journalist, ca. late '80s

Im sorry you dont think he is a journalist. However, he is still credentialed and gave up sensitive info while embedded in Iraq, thus the requirement for the restrictions on reporting. However, as was noted before, journos are more than free to get their own visas and travel themselves.

A couple of months ago, you mentioned this specific crop substitution as a virtual magic bullet solution to the opium replacement issue.

Hardly, the statement was that it was doing quite well. Which it is. In fact while talking with a local Afghani working with the PRTs about the subject a few months ago he was quite excited about its possibilities.

That'd make it a mighty good talking point, but men who undoubtedly know of it- likely more than yourself- didn't see fit to even mention it.

Hardly a winning argument, as it entirely depends on what questions Karen et al decided to ask and to publish.

Break it down:
Holbrooke - talks about crop eradication waste, doesnt even get in to replacement
Nicholson - talks about basic COIN
Eikenberry - basic COIN

Sorry, but you cant appeal to a persons authority by using comments on a specific subject as evidence for your position on a completely different subject.

That suggests that isn't as miraculous as you implied

Saffron was never stated to be "miraculous", you misunderstood and ran with it

You're young, and have bought the party line hook, line, sinker. Hopefully you'll grow into wisdom, perhaps even remember this someday.

Sorry, but age provides little perspective, and doesnt give someone a free pass to promote their misunderstanding of a situation as "knowledge" when they lack experience on the issue they are trying to discuss.

I'd give him some creds on experience alone

He naturally gets credit subjects occurring around the time period he served, but the Army has changed drastically since then, even in the last few years massive changes has occurred. As such, long past experience doesnt confer immediate cred on current operations.

Last edited by Steyr AUG (2009-08-11 8:40 am)

sturner wrote:

He has no real concept of how it is on the ground, because his boots are never there.

This is where the experience problem crops up. People who have actually experienced what is like here realize that individuals in Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines are all on the ground doing mounted combat patrols all over Afghanistan attached to the Afghan National Army and police as their trainers.

You yourself were even complaining about Air Force types filling such slots, so why are you surprised when you encounter one who is?

Last edited by Steyr AUG (2009-08-11 11:06 am)