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Of course I am. I wouldnt have said it if I wasnt doing it.

What disturbs me about your talk Steyr, is that you assume that I don't understand that the application of tactics and strategy vary according to weapons, terrain, weather, enemy, and mission. I know that they do. I also know that the basic tenents of tactics and strategy do NOT change often, unless there is a basic change in weapons.

Terminology changes. Terminology are the buzzwords and jargon of the profession. If you are really big in COIN operations, how are your credentials in cultural anthropology? Because that is a very important element of your intellegence assessment.

What truly upsets me is your arrogance about your new-found knowledge, and how it must have ONLY been discovered in the 1990's, and your ignorance of the process of how they develop an application of a strategy or tactic. Changes and development of strategic and tactical inovation for application in new situations comes initially from the field, but it is vetted and refined at the Service Schools and in the Pentagon. Dissemination is then done through the Service Schools, who are responsible for development and dissemination of this information.

What upsets me is your arrogance and disrespect. As a young officer you should, by now, be much more sensitive to respect. You should also be much more tuned into the fact that the current military isn't breaking new ground. They are adapting to a situation. That you don't understand that causes me concern because it indicates to me that you aren't thinking deeply about these things.

Yes, my era was faced with large, organized, trained threats. As well as insurrgencies. That you feel, and have stated many times that that experience is worthless and doesn't apply to todays situation speaks of a lack of understanding for theory and application.

If you accompany an Afgan patrol, in what capacity is it? To teach them and advise them on tactics? Or to teach them and advise them on intelligence gathering?

Yes, you can teach a man the basics of infantry tactics in about 5 weeks. But it's just the basics.

There is always a point in an insurrgency when, if they have been successful, they take the field in a convential manner. If you aren't ready to meet them in that manner, you have lost militarily. But by that time, you have already lost the war.

Did you read your Mao? Did you read Sun-Tzu? Did you study the operations conducted in Spain, Malaysia, Indo-China? Do you know why insurrgencies fail?

With your arrogance, I am not confident that you do understand any of that.

This story is ongoing, and not new. This program has been in effect for several years, seemingly under-funded, not fully supported, and not thought out as to what kind of cash crops can grow in the various regions and be attractive commercially, and tehcnically simple enough to be supported by the farmers and the environment.

Bat wrote:

Better than yet aother thread.

U.S. and Britain again target Afghan poppies
Officials hope to provide alternatives before planting season begins in Oct.

(WP) The U.S. and British governments plan to spend millions of dollars over the next two months to try to persuade Afghan farmers not to plant opium poppy, by far the country's most profitable cash crop and a major source of Taliban funding and official corruption.

By selling wheat seeds and fruit saplings to farmers at token prices, offering cheap credit, and paying poppy-farm laborers to work on roads and irrigation ditches, U.S. and British officials hope to provide alternatives before the planting season begins in early October. Many poppy farmers survive Afghanistan's harsh winters on loans advanced by drug traffickers and their associates, repaid with the spring harvest.

"We need a way to get money in [farmers'] hands right away," said a senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan.

The program replaces the Bush administration's focus on crop eradication, which "wasted hundreds of millions of dollars," according to Richard C. Holbrooke, the Obama administration's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Destroying the crops succeeded only in "alienat[ing] poor farmers" and "driving people into the hands of the Taliban," he told reporters last week.

Poor track record
But many previous U.S.-funded crop-substitution programs have failed as well, from Asia to Latin America. A similar plan in Colombia, begun in the late 1990s, has barely made a dent in the level of cocaine production, although the country began to stabilize in recent years as its U.S.-trained military adopted new strategies against armed insurgents and civil institutions were strengthened.

Officials maintain that the new Afghan plan differs from unsuccessful "alternative" plans because it is an integral part of a military-development strategy that includes tens of thousands of U.S. troops to keep the Taliban and traffickers at bay while Afghan security forces are being trained. Plans call for hundreds of U.S. and international aid experts to work directly with farmers and local officials until the Afghan government has matured.

"The way [the assistance] is offered is important," said the senior U.S. military official, one of [..]
..

The epicenter of the overlapping wars against opium production and the Taliban is southern Afghanistan's Helmand province, where more than two-thirds of the country's poppy is grown. Thousands of Marines and British troops are in the midst of a major offensive there against entrenched insurgent forces and are providing security in villages as they are cleared.

Wheat seeds and fruit saplings. What happened to Steyr's alternative crop?

sturner wrote:

If you accompany an Afgan patrol, in what capacity is it?

To advise them on whatever it takes to make a specific operation successful. Supply, QRF, presence patrol, whatever it may be.

Yes, my era was faced with large, organized, trained threats. As well as insurrgencies.

And what was your function in your era? Did you run combat operations? Train foreign forces? Participate directly in counterinsurgencies?

Marines storm Taliban town in Afghanistan
New offensive aims to gain control of strategic area ahead of elections

DAHANEH, Afghanistan (AP) - Helicopter-borne U.S. Marines backed by Harrier jets stormed into a strategic Taliban-held town in southern Afghanistan before dawn Wednesday, battling to gain control of the area ahead of next week's presidential elections.

Associated Press journalists traveling with the first wave said Marines were met with small arms, mortar and rocket propelled grenade fire as they flew in helicopters over Taliban lines and dropped into the town. Fighting was still under way hours later, with U.S. Marine Harrier jets streaking overhead and dropping flares in a show of force.

Other Marines met heavy resistance as they fought to seize control of the mountains surrounding Dahaneh in the southern province of Helmand. Another convoy of Marines rolled into the town despite roadside bomb attacks and gunfire.

It was the first time NATO troops had entered Dahaneh, which has been under Taliban control for years. Casualty figures were unavailable due to security restrictions.

U.S., NATO and Afghan troops are working to protect voting sites around the country so Afghans can take part in the country's second-ever direct presidential election. Taliban militants have vowed to disrupt the elections, and attacks are on the rise around Afghanistan.

Marines said they had captured several suspects in Wednesday's push and seized about 66 pounds of opium, which the militants use to finance their insurgency. Troops hope to restore control of the town so that residents can vote in the presidential election.

The new offensive, named "Eastern Resolve 2," is designed to break the monthslong stalemate in this southern valley where the Taliban are solidly entrenched. By occupying Dahaneh, the Marines hope to isolate insurgents in woods and mountains, away from civilian centers.

"I think this has the potential to be a watershed," said Capt. Zachary Martin, commander of Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, who lead the assault.

Hopes for a ripple effect

Speaking of name-dropping, are you on a first-name basis with Karen DeYoung, Steyr? You've only referred to her as 'Karen.'

IIRC sturner's era was the same as this guy's, and our own former Mod the Battlecat. Be nice to have tBC drop in on this thread, unlikely tho that is; he's deaf at certain freqs from too many grenades going off nearby. My favorite writing of his was always

12-19: 9:45 AM Tuesday the 18th of December marks the passing of my little cat Smoggy. In my 53 years: I have buried my father, in Vietnam I have been covered in blood, stacked bodies like cord wood, and pulled screaming wounded men out of burning helicopters, then back home again I buried my mother. But perversely, never have I been so torn with grief, so wracked with remorse and loss then when my decade long companion became terminally ill, was put to sleep at my request and buried by me in the garden at my home. In the past I have been so profoundly stoic and numb to the past horrors in my life that I am truly amazed at the depth of my emotion, the extent of my sorrow. I didn't think I had it in me. Smoggy gave me 10 years of pure unconditional love and as his final gift in the end, he proved to me that I am human after all. I will always miss him.

Two tours with the Marines ca. '69, speaking of the sharp end.

Ribtorus wrote:

Big problem is making a meaningful distinction between "local" and "Taliban".

The Afghans can't do it, why do we think we can?

Who's side is Hekmatyar on? His own. That's A'stan and we need to stop kidding ourselves and them.

I just heard some reporter on news radio this week saying the locals hate the foreign (started with a p, too loud and I didn't catch part of it here) and would kill them if given a chance. I got the impression (mistaken?) that it was the opposite of what you just said. Maybe I missed a critical part?

The Taliban isn't the same as the insurrgents in Iraq. They have had several decades of experience behind them. They also conducted a successful insurrgency once before, against a First World military power. It's not like they are rank amateurs.

Marines in Afghan town meet fire from all sides
Taliban resistance fiercer than expected in second day of fighting

DAHANEH, Afghanistan (AP) - U.S. aircraft and missiles pounded Taliban mountainside positions around Dahaneh on Thursday as Marines pushed through mudbrick compounds searching for militants in the second day of fighting to seize this strategic southern town.

Also in the south, four NATO service members — three British and one American — were killed in separate explosions Thursday, military officials said.

August's casualty count is likely to surpass the record 75 deaths U.S. and NATO troops suffered in July, the deadliest month for the international force in the nearly eight-year war. The violence comes as Afghans prepare to vote in Aug. 20 presidential elections.

U.S. Marines launched a major assault Wednesday against Taliban forces in Dahaneh, a town of 2,000 people that controls major trade routes in the northern part of Helmand, the southern province that has become center stage in the war.

By Thursday evening, the Marines and Afghan troops had managed to take about half the town, with Taliban resistance tougher than expected.

As sporadic clashes continued in Dahaneh, Marine Cobra attack helicopters fired rockets at Taliban positions in the nearby mountains where militants were believed firing at troops in the town.

Later, U.S. A-10 fighter-bombers fired multiple rounds into the barren, rocky cliffs overlooking what the Marines call "Hell's Pass," the entrance into the Now Zad valley, and U.S. surface-to-surface missiles, fired from the main Marine base, pounded the hillsides.

Sit there and take it like fanatics, guys. Sturner?

No, they're not disorganized. They've dug in- wonder if they have escape routes, or just plan on taking as many infidels with them as they can. They've taken the field conventionally as mentioned, at least here.

No one ever accused Cheney, Bush or Rumsfeld of being Great Captains. They totally screwed up the Iraq strategy from the start. Any administration that screws up their diplomacy yet banks on a foreign nation allowing them access, and then don't have a plan when their movement falls through, leaving and entire Armored Division floating around unable to land their equipment and men, is not a surfeit with strategic competence. And that didn't even take into account the fact that we hadn't finished in Afgan. It was like the nation was controlled by people with ADD.

Well, he's no Robert McNamara.